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Abstract 
This author examines the doping debate’s fundamental question: is sport justified to prohibit certain 
performance-enhancing substances? Although a well-trod question, this article argues that historical 
justification for banning doping does not provide sufficient reason to continue banning substances 
today.  At the same time, current approaches that rely heavily on bioethical arguments only address a 
small portion of the doping debate. This paper will argue that the bioethical issues do not apply since 
sport, as a subspecies of games, ask that game players follow specific rules when participating in the 
game. Thus this paper develops arguments about doping related to the game test and separate from 
past bioethical debates over doping. These arguments use a test-relevant approach where sporting 
communities democratically evaluate the effects of individual substances on their specific sport. The 
result of a test-relevant approach is that sporting communities choose specific substances to permit or 
ban rather than having a universal agreed upon list of banned substances. This paper concludes with a 
brief discussion of the practical benefits including more meaningful prohibitions, more specific 
testing, and, potentially, sports that permit certain performance-enhancing substances currently 
prohibited by the World Anti-Doping Agency.
Keywords:  doping, performance-enhancement, sporting tests.
Abstract 
Este autor examina una cuestión fundamental en el debate que gira en torno al dopaje: ¿está 
justificado que en el deporte se prohíba el uso de ciertas sustancias mejoradoras del rendimiento? Si 
bien se trata de una pregunta recurrente, este artículo sostiene que la justificación histórica para la 
prohibición del dopaje no proporciona razones suficientes para continuar la prohibición de tales 
sustancias a día de hoy. Paralelamente, los enfoques actuales que dependen, en gran medida,  de los 
argumentos bioéticos sólo se refieren a un ámbito reducido del debate que gira en torno al dopaje. Este 
trabajo propone que las cuestiones de bioética no se apliquen desde el deporte, como una subespecie 
de juegos, y reclama que los jugadores sigan reglas específicas al participar en el juego. Por ende, este 
artículo desarrolla los argumentos sobre el dopaje en relación con la prueba de juego y separándolo de 
los trasnochados debates bioéticos sobre el dopaje. Estos argumentos utilizan un enfoque de prueba 
pertinente cuando las comunidades deportivas democráticamente evalúan los efectos de las distintas 
sustancias en su deporte específico.  El resultado de un enfoque de prueba pertinente es que las 
comunidades deportivas eligen las sustancias específicas que permiten o prohíben en lugar de haber 
un acuerdo universal en el listado de sustancias prohibidas. Este artículo concluye con una breve 
discusión de los beneficios prácticos incluyendo las prohibiciones más significativas, las pruebas más 
específicas y, potencialmente, los deportes que permiten ciertas sustancias para mejorar el rendimiento 
actualmente prohibidas por la Agencia Mundial Antidopaje.
Términos Clave: dopaje, mejora en el rendimiento (deportivo), pruebas deportivas. 
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1. Introduction1
The entire doping issue in sport hinges on one single question: are existing rules prohibiting 
doping justified? If they are justified—or if we can at least conclude that some substances should 
be banned—we can set to work creating good anti-doping policies. If they are not—and we find 
that sport has no reason, moral or otherwise, to regulate what substances athletes use—we must 
reconsider whether we need the current anti-doping complex that now dominates sport. But none 
of this falls into place until we determine whether such policies are justified.
To be sure, the sporting world appears convinced that it  should ban doping, and that 
enforcing this ban remains a top priority. Sporting officials talk about a “war on doping” that 
must be waged in order to save the integrity  of sport. The general public, at least in popular 
discourse, appears to support anti-doping measures as well.2  Often their supportPES emerges 
from the popular belief that sport should exist as a healthy and morally edifying activity, and that 
using performance-enhancing substances is necessarily unhealthy, cheating, and immoral. Such a 
view amounts to an ethical rationale justifying the bans on doping, even if it is theoretically 
undeveloped, and has historically supported efforts to prevent athletes from doping. However, 
scholars have pointed out that  such arguments, at least without further support, cannot justify 
banning such substances, and, more importantly, that such justification ignores the complexity  of 
the performance-enhancement issue. In fact, the scholarly debate illustrates this decidedly  mixed 
issue, with some scholars arguing that the bans are not justified (A. Miah, Bengt Kayser, 
Alexander Mauron, 2005; C. Tamburrini, 2007) and others concluding that they are (W. Morgan, 
2009; Murray, 1983).
The philosophical arguments of scholars have tended towards two lines of thinking. One 
approach uses metaphysical claims about  the nature of sport to advocate for a position while the 
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1  A special thanks to Tim Lehrbach for his useful guidance and insights. His contribution significantly 
improved this article, though any faults or mistakes remain my own.
2  Empirical evidence also suggests the general public holds anti-doping attitudes. See USADA Report, 
“What Sport Means to America: A Study of Sport’s Role in Society” March 2011.
other pursues bioethical arguments to demonstrate their position’s rationale. Unfortunately, both 
of these approaches have failed to generate consensus among scholars and, as I will argue, may 
be incapable of resolving the disagreement. I will advocate for a recent and developing third 
option discussed in Gleaves, (2011b) and Morgan, (2009) which I will call a test-relevant 
approach to better show the relevant issues. To show why this new option provides useful 
insights into the doping debate, I will first briefly sketch the history of doping in sport. I will use 
this history to show that the assumed arguments lack their supposed normative force. I will next 
argue that the bioethical arguments likely  only  apply in extreme cases and are not capable of 
providing final answers to the doping question. I will then articulate a third approach that 
considers performance-enhancing substances (PES) as one aspect among a sport’s many artificial 
tests. I argue that the decision whether to permit or ban the use of any  PES must begin by 
examining its relevance to the test. I will conclude by showing how this third option applies to 
current doping issues. This test-relevant approach offers a better way to consider the decision to 
ban PESs and, if put into practice, offers certain pragmatic benefits for those choosing to ban 
doping.
2. A (Quick) Intellectual History of Doping
As the American novelist William Faulkner explained, “The past is not dead. In fact, it’s not 
even the past.” Such sentiments certainly resonate in the doping case. Although few realize it, 
today’s attitudes towards doping and pharmacological enhancement—from the moralized 
rhetoric to the desire to preserve naturalness—live as much rooted in the past as the 
pharmacological substances they apply to flourish in the present. As explored below, these 21st 
century concerns reflect  the 20th century concerns over public health and temperance. Those, in 
turn, reflect the 19th century notion that sport could transmit social values and build character, 
which, in turn, reflect the post-enlightenment developed cosmology that simultaneously 
embraced promise and the fear that through science humans could increasingly  manipulate the 
natural world. Indeed, the 21st century  attitude reflects the age-old “Promethean” fear that 
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humanity, unrestrained in its technological quest for mastery, risks stealing from the gods 
something more powerful than it can handle. 
To be sure, throughout modern sport humans have certainly  attempted to enhance 
performance through a variety of methods including the use of substances and herbal remedies.3 
The idea of enhancing performance is not new. However, as modern sport thoroughly took hold 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century, human athletes increasingly applied the methods of 
science and Enlightenment thought to their sporting performances. By the turn-of-the-century, 
“stimulants” included substances such as alcohol, strychnine, narcotics, or digitalis—all of which 
have fallen out of favor with athletes for good reason.4 Yet historian John Hoberman explains 
that for early  sporting communities, as opposed to those today, “doping was not regarded as an 
illicit practice; it was rather seen as an antidote to the extreme fatigue experienced by the athletes 
of that era” (Hunt, 2011, p. iv). In the working-class professional sports of the early twentieth 
century, professional athletes found the freedom to use stimulants as they plied their labor free 
from moralizing influence while the news media portrayed such practices as professional tools of 
the trade.5
Even into the 1920s, this attitude persisted in professional sport (Gleaves, 2011a). Few 
regarded doping in professional sport as unfair or cheating. Rather, the act of doping to assist in 
physical labor fit within the acceptable range of social behaviors for the working-classes. Their 
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3 Evidence on this cultural practice remains controversial, as it is unclear how the Greeks understood this 
aspect of sport performance. Nonetheless, there is evidence that they sought  to improve performance in 
such ways. See (Hoberman, 1992)
4Historians have produced a wealth of studies chronicling the spread of doping and performance 
enhancement in modern sport. (Dimeo, 2007; Hoberman, 2005, 2006, 2007; Møller, 2008; Rosen, 2008)
5  Professional cycling trainer James “Choppy” Warburton openly doped his riders throughout the 1880s 
and 1890s and also allegedly used substances to prevent one of his athletes from winning.5 Reports also 
indicated that professional pedestrians and prize fighters doped during competitions.5  By 1903, the 
public’s expectation that  professional athletes put on a good show increased to the point  that  in one case, a 
reporter openly lamented the lack of doping when fatigue slowed the riders at a six-day cycling race at 
New York City’s Madison Square Garden. The journalist  complained that  “some of them seemed sadly in 
need of stimulants.”5  A 1904 article discussed the value of “a good second” in a prizefight since they 
knew how to dope the boxers with stimulants.
jobs demanded they use their bodies in physically demanding ways. Unlike the middle- and 
upper-classes, who used amateur sport as a tool for moral betterment, social status, and control of 
leisure, the working classes used professional sport not for leisure but as a means for economic 
profit. Middle class notions about sport’s moral purpose, both in this era and throughout the 
twentieth century, did not apply. Instead, the physical toll of professional contests such as racing 
often meant that athletes used drugs to combat fatigue rather than gain an edge. Even in pre-
professional sports such as the 1904 and 1908 Olympic marathons—where the fields of entrants 
often comprised working-class individuals—working class athletes could acceptably dope. Given 
the sport’s physical demands, many apostles of amateurism regarded the marathon as a sport 
suited for working-class professionals. Thus, when reports of Thomas Hicks in the 1904 Olympic 
marathon and Dorando Pietri in the 1908 Olympic marathon using PES surfaced, no one 
objected to such practices.6 Sports such as boxing and cycling also fit  the description of working-
class sports unconcerned with doping. In these pre-professional sports, sportswriters would even 
go so far as to distinguish between “professional” and “professional amateur” (Pegler, 1930). For 
both classes, doping remained an acceptable aspect of such sports since the athletes emerged 
from the working-class with sights set on professional sport. 
By the interwar era of sport, concerns over amateurism and sport’s moral value combined 
with increasing social reticence towards drugs in popular culture to lead to the first anti-doping 
bans. The public became increasingly concerned that elite athletes failed to embody  the social 
values desired from sport. One turning point came when journalist Albert Londres recorded a 
conversation with Tour de France cyclists at  a café in 1924. Londres recounts the cyclists—Henri 
Pelissier, Francis Pelissier and Maurice Ville—in the following:
“We suffer on the road. But do you want to see how we keep going? Wait...”
From his bag he takes a phial. “That, that's cocaine for our eyes and chloroform for our 
gums...”
“Here,” said Ville, tipping out the contents of his bag, “horse liniment to keep  my knees 
warm. And pills? You want to see the pills?” They got out three boxes apiece.
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6 For more on Hicks and Pietri’s doping as amateurs see Gleaves (2011a).
“In short,” said Francis, “we run on dynamite.” Quoted from (Thompson, 2008, p. 190).
However, these practices eventually  raised concern among those in amateur sporting circles. 
In 1928, the International Amateur Athletic Federation passed an anti-doping rule that read:
“Doping is the use of any stimulant not normally  employed to increase the power of action 
in athletic competition above the average. Any person knowingly  acting or assisting as explained 
above shall be excluded from any place where these rules are in force, or if he is a competitor, be 
suspended for a time or otherwise, from further participation in amateur athletics under the 
jurisdiction of this federation.” (IAAF, 1928) 
Similarly  the IOC would state that it considered doping a violation of its amateurism code in 
1938 (Gleaves and Llewellyn). Yet in 1960, the sporting landscape changed drastically when 
Danish cyclist  Knud Enemark Jensen tragically  died at the Rome Olympic Games. Following 
Jensen’s death French cycling coach Robert Ouberon drove home the idea that doping and the 
world of moral amateur sport do not mix, stating that  “many pros are drugged, of course, but we 
don’t drug amateurs” (Daley, 1960).
Although evidence calls into question the cause of Jensen’s death (Møller, 2006), the tragic 
event that unfolded under the spotlight of the Olympic Games provided a face for those seeking 
to underscore the health risks of doping and who viewed doping as anathema to idealized 
amateur sport. In starts and stops following Jensen’s demise, anti-doping policies grew more 
established. Drug testing increased, often as a reaction to drug-related scandals. Initially 
hamstrung by science and politics, the IOC finally  introduced drug testing at the 1968 Games, 
but would not have a serious commitment to curtail doping practices until after Canadian sprinter 
Ben Johnson’s high-profile positive test for stanolzolol during the 1988 Olympic games (Dimeo, 
2007). As the Cold War’s “big arms” race played out in anti-doping of the 1970s (Hunt, 2011) 
and a global war on drugs (regardless of whether their use was for sport or recreation) swept the 
1980s (Davenport-Hines, 2002), the intellectual streams of early  anti-doping ideologies joined 
larger social tributaries. The NCAA approved drug testing rules in 1986 following scandals at 
Clemson University (White, 1986). The National Football League began drug testing in the late 
1980s after a string of high-profile players suffered drug-related deaths. Major League Baseball, 
one of the last organizations to implement drug testing, finally succumbed to public pressure in 
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2004 following a high number of anonymous tests that were positive for anabolic steroids and 
human growth hormone the previous season and the constant, less anonymous public scandals 
involving its athletes (Hoberman, 2005).
The most recent substantial change in anti-doping policy came in 1999 with the 
establishment of the World Anti-Doping Agency  (WADA). WADA exists as a quasi-independent 
agency designed to oversee all doping related issues ranging from policies, testing and 
punishments to education and even, at times, the provision of legal assistance to governments 
wishing to prosecute athletes caught using performance-enhancing substances. WADA handles 
all Olympic sporting federations’ drug testing and sets the policies which the international 
federations follow. WADA currently receives official endorsement from the United Nations 
through UNESCO as well as numerous countries including the United States (WADA, 2009). 
While drug testing policies—including WADA’s own—continue to evolve, anti-doping attitudes 
remain rooted in WADA’s Code (2009), which considers doping unhealthy, unfair, and contrary 
to the spirit of sport.
While WADA represents the dominant narrative shaping today’s anti-doping debate, the 
intellectual history of anti-doping reveals a deep connection with the Victorian values of 
amateurism. Amateurism provided the view of sport that rejected doping. The idea that sport was 
about health, clean living, and, above all else, a specific vision of moral behavior, meant that the 
negative attitudes towards working-class professionals who regularly  doped and the social 
stigma towards drug users in general created an environment that viewed performance-enhancing 
substances as illegitimate sporting practices. In that sense, although the sporting world has long 
since dropped amateur rules as moral codes governing athlete conduct, tacit  amateur values 
continue to guide attitudes and policies towards doping. Scholars must appreciate that many of 
the presumed premises of the doping debate are neither natural facts nor moral principles. 
Rather, they emerge tethered to a specific ideology that used anti-doping arguments to 
disenfranchise lower classes of athletes. They  become reified by  way of the reactionary efforts 
sporting organizations undertake to ensure their sport’s moral credibility  following public 
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scandal. Scholars should dismiss these well-worn anti-doping arguments of the past as 
interesting historical anachronisms rather than tools for resolving current debates.
3. Bioethical Approaches to Doping
In fact, many scholars have already done so. Although the initial inspiration for prohibiting 
doping used the ideology of amateurism, fairness, and health concerns to justify its position, 
scholars have pointed out that these traditional reasons for opposing doping do not withstand 
heavy  scrutiny (Møller, 2010b; Waddington & Smith, 2009). Although anti-doping policies 
remained in place, they  lacked a moral “Archimedean point” from which sporting communities 
could justify such policies. Scholars on both sides of the doping debate sought more 
sophisticated avenues for examining the ethics of doping. This prompted interest in the field of 
bioethics. Much of the scholarly doping debate typically, though not always, relies on bioethical 
arguments to justify a position. These arguments involve debates over paternalism (Brown, 2007; 
Simon, 2010), autonomy (Munthe, 2007; C. Tamburrini, 2007), coercion (Breivik, 1992; 
Gardner, 1989), equal access (Loland, 2009) and the nature of being human (A. Miah, 2004; 
Sandel, 2007). The fact that philosophers naturally turn to bioethics in the doping debate makes 
sense. A branch of ethics, bioethics examines controversial issues brought about by medical and 
scientific advances. But is bioethics the best approach to the doping debate? 
While progress has been made on some specific issues, the general question as to whether 
the doping bans are justified is as murky as ever. As Simon recently  concluded in his 3rd edition 
of Fair Play: The Ethics of Sport, “When I first started writing about performance-enhancing 
drugs in the 1980s, my initial intuition was that  their use to enhance performance in athletics was 
clearly  wrong….However, I believe such a conclusion is more open to debate than I first thought 
and that the pros and cons are more complex than I realized” (2010, p. 109). Indeed, after nearly 
three decades applying bioethical arguments to the doping debate, such arguments have failed to 
provide scholars with a clear cut rationale to justify either prohibiting or permitting PES in sport.
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The reason for much of this failure is that, except in extreme cases, bioethical arguments do 
not shed much light on the justification for game rules within the context of games. As 
philosophers of sport have argued, sports are institutions created by constitutive and regulative 
game rules that function to govern the activity (Kretchmar, 2001; W. J. Morgan, 1995; Russell, 
1999). Of course within such institutions, ordinary ethics, including bioethics, always 
applies. 
Ethical obligations exist regardless of the game players’ status as game players. For 
example, ethical norms against  murdering exist for a game player regardless of a game’s rules. In 
the real world, sports often attempt to mitigate risk and limit violence in order to preserve basic 
moral tenets that emerge out of respect for human life. In rare instances where sports permit 
unethical behavior, such as perhaps the Roman coliseum, where murder of non-voluntary 
participants occurred, ethicists can—and should—point out that such behavior is unethical. But 
such instances where a game’s rules can be ethically evaluated are rare. Please note, I do not say 
“rarely” here as an overly cautious way  of hedging my claim when I really mean to say “never.” 
There are definitely cases where bioethical questions go live in sports, including within the 
doping debate. Concerns about medical privacy, drug testing children, and athletes’ health are 
examples of bioethical issues related to doping. The emerging controversies surrounding 
concussions and head injuries in American football and the medical treatment provided to injured 
athletes are additional examples of bioethical issues.7 These questions focus on preserving the 
moral integrity of the activity. Yet such bioethical arguments miss the heart of the doping debate.
In general, bioethical issues in sport rarely occur because most sporting issues really amount 
to means/ends debates. Means/ends debates focus around the permissible means to achieve a 
game’s ends. When sporting communities address such debates, they focus on lusory issues, such 
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7  For fuller treatment of these as bioethical issues, see (Loland, Skirstad, & Waddington, 2006; C. M. 
Tamburrini & Tännsjö, 2005).
as promoting fair contests, durable tests, and the like.8 Such evaluations might  be how long to 
make the game, how to determine the winner, how contestants share the test, and even how to 
define a game’s tests. These determinations are not bioethical in nature. It is not an ethical issue 
to make the marathon 26.2 miles instead of, for example, 26 or 27 miles. Nor is it an ethical issue 
to decide if a basketball game should have four quarters or two halves or if baseball should 
permit a designated hitter. Such decisions have to do with what we consider a “good game.” 
Although there is no single recipe to what makes a good game, it  often involves what Kretchmar 
(1975) has called “just right” tests—tests that are neither too hard nor too easy. This requires 
balancing permitted means with the stipulated ends. For example, the sport of cycling has 
determined that the means involves riding a bicycle that conforms to specific specifications 
including not having a motor. However, the ends test  of cycling involves riding variable 
distances that change based on the talent level of participants and the challenges of the terrain. In 
this way, cycling keeps its means constant  but alters its ends in order to achieve an ideally 
balanced competitive test  for participants. If someone invented a motor that allowed cyclists to 
go ten miles per hour faster while still allowing them to pedal their bicycles, then naturally 
achieving the ends would become easier, potentially destroying the sport’s challenge. Riders 
would finish the same course in less time or expend less energy. Either way, altering the means 
reduces the challenge of the ends. The sport could make the courses more challenging in order to 
restore balance, much like golf famously Tiger-proofed their courses throughout the 2000s, or it 
could simply prohibit the motor-assisted bicycles and choose to keep the bicycles the same.
However, is the central question in the doping debate—is sport justified to prohibit certain 
performance-enhancing substances—a bioethical question or a means/ends question? Most 
philosophers have pursued this question as if it was the former. In part, the bioethical approach 
initially appealed to philosophers because of doping’s perceived negative health effects. 
Especially in the early days of amphetamines, steroids, and erythropoietin, the bioethical 
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8  Critics might argue that fairness is a moral norm. If such fairness is read as justice, I can concede this 
point. However, often rules on fairness have to do with creating an equal or level playing field. These 
considerations, which are what I am referring to, do not have to do with justice but  with creating a good 
game. The desire to create a level playing field is born out of a desire to create a game where winning is 
accurately attributed to the best player. This desire shows that it is lusory consideration having to do with 
determining what we want our games to be about.
approach made sense because scientists understood relatively  little about their health effects and 
feared for the worst. But now, evidence overwhelmingly  indicates that it is possible to administer 
performance-enhancing substances to athletes with minimal risks. As Houlihan has concluded, 
“relying upon health-related arguments to provide a basis for anti-doping policy … is not 
possible” (Houlihan, 2002: 132). With such small risks, arguments addressing personal liberty 
and unjustified paternalism (A. Miah, Bengt Kayser, Alexander Mauron, 2005; C. Tamburrini, 
2007) appear more persuasive in defense of doping than before. Additionally, the health risks of 
doping pale when compared to the risks many athletes regularly  face while participating in their 
sports. These points indicate current performance-enhancing substances do not present serious 
enough health concerns to merit bioethical consideration. Additionally, arguments such as 
fairness and the spirit of sport do not hinge on bioethical considerations (Gardner, 1989; 
Schneider & Butcher, 1994). 
Therefore, few bioethical arguments appear relevant to whether sporting communities can 
justifiably  prohibit athletes from doping. Perhaps, when considering banning future genetic 
technologies philosophers still have good reason to explore bioethical concerns. And bioethical 
issues still emerge on the periphery of the doping debate with issues of medical privacy, 
disclosure of testing results, personal freedoms, and harm reduction. However, as philosophers 
have seen, the results of such arguments have yet to resolve the central doping questions and 
such questions lie precisely at the heart of the doping debate.9 As I will argue below, the doping 
debate can benefit by considering performance-enhancing substances as part of the means/ends 
debate and that bioethics, for all its promise, does not apply to the central doping question. 
Rather, the answer to whether sporting organizations can justifiably prohibit  performance-
enhancing substances hinges on how individual sporting communities evaluate the effects of 
specific substances on their sporting tests. Viewed in this light, the doping debate ought to 
involve different determinations than scholars have typically  used. By looking at  the debate in 
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9 I do concede that approaches such as Kayser and Broer’s (2012) harm-reduction argument to illicit  drug 
use in sport provides a useful bioethical argument to the doping question. However, those who typically 
disagree with Kayser and Broer’s line of argument  assert  that the doping debate amounts to more than 
harm reduction and permitting performance-enhancing substances violates some other undefined aspect 
of sport.
this way, sports will create their own set of banned substances based on their internal values 
rather than the current model used by the World Anti-Doping Agency  (2009) of a single anti-
doping code that lists all banned substances for all sports.
4. The Test-Relevant Approach
As an alternative to the bioethical approach, I suggest that scholars and sporting 
communities ought to examine how a performance-enhancing substance would alter each sport’s 
test and the values associated with that test.10 I call this process of examination the test-relevant 
approach. The test-relevant approach first examines the ways that introducing a performance 
enhancer into a sport affects a sport’s tests. In principle, enhancers can have one of three effects. 
They  can help, harm, or have no effect on the current test. To determine whether a performance-
enhancer (or a rule change, in general) has helped, harmed or had no effect on a sport, we can 
evaluate how the change impacts the values laden in the test. These values can be the testing of 
certain qualities such as endurance, physical skills, or strategic considerations, among many, 
many others.11  Testing these qualities has value insofar as cultures and individuals associate 
meaning with the results of such tests. Whatever prowess is demonstrated by the tests of, for 
example, football, weight lifting, wrestling, athletics—of which each is admittedly  multi-faceted
— is meaningful to the sporting community. 
In the case of a performance-enhancer, sporting organizations can justifiably  prohibit  it if the 
effects of the performance enhancer alter the test  in undesirable ways. For example, if a 
technology renders a sport’s central challenge irrelevant, as would be the case when using a 
GPS-guided golf ball, then a sport can decide to ban it  in favor of preserving the test—in this 
case, the golfing test that requires that golfers can hit the ball in the direction of the hole.
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10 Critics might object  to this claim by arguing that safety would, in fact, be the first  consideration. But 
such a claim is hasty. If a change to a rule harms a test, then there is no reason to evaluate the rule 
changes safety. However, if a rule change makes a test  better, gamewrights may want  to examine the 
safety implications. Thus in both cases, safety considerations follow the lusory considerations.
11  To be clear, this shift towards testing values is not a move towards MacIntyre’s “internal goods” 
argument.  Indeed, internal goods, which are goods specific to practices is far more narrow than my 
conception of test-relevant values, which are values attached to the testing of certain qualities.
Additionally, a sporting organization can decide to ban an enhancement if allowing it does 
not add anything to the test. This second reason works much like an “Occam’s Razor” for sport 
in that when faced with two equally appealing tests—one with the enhancer and one without—
sporting organizations ought to err on the side of simplicity and ban the enhancement. Sports 
ought to err on the side of simplicity because undesirable complexity can detract from an 
athlete’s experience. For example, if a sport’s community determines that an enhancer does not 
make the test any better but simply  adds cost, provides another opportunity for a game to go 
awry, decreases the time available for playing the sport, or adds undesirable redundancy to the 
test, sporting communities would have good reason to prefer the simpler version and exclude the 
enhancer.12
While the test-relevant approach provides justification for banning a performance enhancer, 
it also can justify permitting it. In cases where permitting an enhancement or technology 
improves a test, sporting communities can—and usually do—embrace such changes. Such 
changes can come in the form of improved equipment, rule modifications, performance-
enhancing technology such as PES or even genetic engineering. Equipment that  functions better 
or allows better players to more fully demonstrate excellence or creativity can improve tests 
when compared to their older versions. Rules can be changed so as to allow new equipment or 
strategies that will enhance challenges, make the sport more enjoyable, or close undesirable 
loopholes. In those instances, sports can certainly embrace such rule changes because the 
improved game test is more enjoyable than the one it replaced. Skiing provided such an example 
when the sport embraced side-cut  skis that  allowed both recreational skiers to master the sport 
quicker while allowing expert skiers to ski even faster. 
The test-relevant approach also considers the possibility  that introducing new elements to a 
sport might not improve a test, yet trying to enforce a ban proves problematic. In those cases, 
where a rule change does not enhance a sport but enforcing the bans clearly  harms the sport, a 
Fair Play, vol.1 n.2, 2013                                                                                                       John Gleaves
Fair Play  ISSN: 2014-9255                                                                                                                                         51
12 For a clear picture of such a stewardship model, see Robert  Simon’s Fair Play: The Ethics of Sport 2nd, 
chapter on the ethics of commercialism and sports equipment. In it, Simon advocates for a shared 
stewardship model between sport communities, their official organizations, and the manufactures who sell 
products. These stakeholders each have a moral obligation to determine what improves the sport.
sport can justifiably  decide to change its rule and relax a previous prohibition. For example, the 
rules surrounding amateurism in many Olympic sports during the mid-twentieth century proved 
very hard to enforce and led to “shamateurism.”13  Although sporting organizations may  have 
wished to preserve amateurism, enforcing amateur rules in the face of illicit payments proved 
detrimental to all parties involved. The cures, in a sense, proved more harmful than the 
competitive disease. Thus changing the rules to permit payments may not have improved sport, 
but it avoided the negative effects of the ban.
While the test-relevant approach provides a useful set of criteria for arbitrating performance 
enhancement, it also differs from many  of the previous approaches. Importantly, the test-relevant 
approach does not depend on sports having any internal goods or essences that need preserving, 
something frequently cited in previous doping debates. Instead, this argument simply looks at 
lusory considerations for a sporting test from the perspective of problem-solving and 
playability.14  All sports are open for adjustment if such adjustments can improve the sport’s 
lusory appeal. If a performance-enhancer improves a test in some demonstrable way, a change 
can be justified. If a sport’s test is harmed, the change is not. There is no appeal to a 
metaphysical or naturalistic claim about the essence of sports or about what counts as enhanced 
and what counts as natural. The appeal is a more pragmatic one. It is related to the kinds of 
challenges that people find gratuitous, and such gratuity  includes a variety of characteristics. 
While people can disagree on what features should be preserved, enhanced, de-emphasized, or 
eliminated, it is also possible for those who play  these games to establish a rough consensus on 
how the game should be played or, in cases where judgments are uncertain, to at  least support a 
degree of experimentation and further assessment.
Fair Play, vol.1 n.2, 2013                                                                                                       John Gleaves
Fair Play  ISSN: 2014-9255                                                                                                                                         52
13 The under-the-table payment of amateur athletes led to a practice called “shamateurism,” where athletes 
pretended to be amateurs although receiving payment. In this example, the sporting organizations could 
not stop such payments and the enforcements had negative consequences for both innocent and offending 
athletes. 
14  Many things contribute to a sport’s enjoyability such as good challenges, sensuousness of the sport, 
playability, durability and more. Altering such characteristics alter a test’s enjoyability. Performance 
enhancers can certainly affect the characteristics that  make tests enjoyable thus what  matters is how 
performance enhancers affect a test’s enjoyability via characteristics such as durability, playability, etc.
At the same time, the test-relevant approach presupposes—and subsequently benefits from
—a philosophically established conception of sport. As Suits argues, games are “voluntary 
attempts to overcome unnecessary obstacles” by  inefficient means. Good games, Suits contends, 
involve well-balanced tests where the means and the challenges are neither too difficult nor too 
easy (2005, p. 52). As Meier (1988) argued, all sports are games that rely on varying levels of 
physical performance to voluntarily overcome obstacles but good sports will have rules that 
outline challenges with desirable degrees of difficulty. If a sporting community alters its rules 
and accidently  makes its challenge too difficult, the sport will not endure. Players will become 
frustrated by  a seemingly-impossible test. At the same time, if a sport alters its rules and makes 
the challenge too easy, perhaps by permitting a type of performance enhancing technology, it will 
also not endure. Its test will be reduced to “child’s play” and hold little appeal for those seeking a 
durable game. The time spent playing may decrease or it may test different characteristics that 
the sporting community does not wish to test. By making the test too easy, sporting communities 
may lose many of the characteristics of a good test.
Additionally, the test-relevant approach incorporates Kretchmar’s explanation that games 
can be put to two uses—testing and contesting (Kretchmar, 1975). Testing problems, Kretchmar 
explains, are the artificial challenges game players must overcome, while contesting problems 
emerge when competitors undertake the same test in an effort to perform better than one another. 
Both testing and contesting problems are important components of sport. In sports, testing 
problems can be durable challenges such as skiing quickly down an icy  slope or shooting a ball 
through a ten-foot high hoop. Contesting problems enter when we attempt to negotiate a testing 
problem better than an opponent. To extend the examples, this would mean attempting to ski 
down an icy  slope faster than someone else or to put a ball through a ten-foot high hoop more 
often than an opponent in a set amount of time. The comparative project introduces new 
strategies (when or how to make a move) and new behaviors (taking unusual risks in order to 
take the lead).
When sporting communities use the test-relevant approach, they can examine how such 
changes affect the sport’s testing and contesting problems. A change to a game’s rules may affect 
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the difficulty of either or both, and, once again, they can affect them for better, for worse, or in 
no appreciable way. For example, a substance such as erythropoietin (EPO) may  make a testing 
problem easier by increasing an athlete’s ability  endurance. A substance can also make a 
contesting problem easier, if, for example, it  could steady  an athlete’s nerves in face of 
competitive challenges. Thus a test-relevant debate over a rule change should consider what 
affects the change has on both sets of problems Kretchmar identified.
The test-relevant approach also conforms to Russell’s conception of broad internalism as a 
justifiable explanation for rule changes (1999). Broad internalism describes how game-
communities can alter their rules without  harming the integrity of the game. Sporting 
organizations typically modify their rules for many reasons but with the end result of preventing 
harm to their sport or making the sport better. A sporting organization might modify  rules to 
prevent previously unthought-of actions such as using ones’ hat to catch a baseball or to improve 
a sport such as introducing the forward pass into football. When new technology arises that 
allows players to perform better in a sport, people may debate whether the rules ought to permit 
or prohibit  such technology. In fact, the sport of cycling is currently debating whether riders 
ought to be allowed to use radios during the race. This technology allows a team to better 
coordinate its strategy, but removes certain tactical challenges from the race. All of these 
deliberations point to sporting organizations’ capacity  to successfully navigate the challenges of 
performance-enhancing substances.
While the test-relevant approach benefits from its philosophical consistency, it  also reframes 
the perennial doping question as a less emotionally-charged issue. Rather than debating the 
ethics of doping, the test-relevant approach considers all issues as they relate to the relationship 
between a sport’s means and its ends. Any  change in the permitted means can modify athletes’ 
performances. Debating whether such modifications are an improvement avoids the problematic 
assumption that plagues the doping debate, which is the assumption that doping is inherently 
wrong and those who do dope have violated a fundamental moral principle. In part, this attitude 
stems from the previous bioethical approach which attempted to turn the doping debate into a 
moral issue. The test-relevant approach asks whether a substance improves performance in way 
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that affect the integrity  of the test, not whether the technology itself is morally  problematic for 
sport.
5. Advantages of the Test-Relevant Approach
Given the interest in doping by philosophers of sport, surprisingly the test-relevant approach 
has remained largely absent from the doping debate. However, when considering the issue of 
doping, each sporting community should consider performance-enhancing substances separately. 
This marks a change from the current approach that treats doping as a single catch-all of 
substances. Since EPO and anabolic steroids differ significantly in their physiological function, it 
makes sense to consider them separately. Their effects on the sporting test will differ widely. 
EPO provides athletes with endurance by creating more red blood cells to deliver oxygen to 
working muscles. Anabolic steroids help  with strength and recovery by increasing protein 
synthesis in muscle cells. Other substances including many stimulants and beta-antagonists have 
been shown to provide only  marginal to little positive effects in specific events. Substances differ 
by mechanisms of action and degrees of effect, and therefore it makes sense to consider them 
separately rather than as one single class of substances.
This is an important step, for under this approach sporting communities will have both the 
ability  and the responsibility to evaluate the decision to permit  or ban those substances based on 
their sport’s demands and decisions internal to the sport. Sporting communities can 
independently evaluate whether specific substances results in conditions that create, from a 
lusory perspective, better testing or contesting problems. If permitting everyone to use substance 
X would improve the sport, make the sport more enjoyable for athletes and the audience, make it 
a fairer competition, allow athletes to express more tactical or skillful excellences, or reduce the 
risk of other injuries, then that substances could be considered a step forward and there would be 
reasons for accepting it  into the sport. For example, if a substance increased athletes’ focus, 
motor sports have reason to embrace the substance, as it would decrease collisions caused by 
driver inattention. One might wonder if this would simply  encourage drivers to go faster, but 
drivers are already driving as fast as they can. Such a substance would only decrease risk of 
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collisions. If inattention caused by fatigue is not a central component of most motor sport  tests, 
then these sports would benefit from permitting such a substance. On the other hand, building on 
Morgan (2009), if the minimally harmful substance removed desirable elements of the sporting 
test, sporting communities would have compelling reasons to ban it. In the example above, if the 
auto sports community agreed that focus while fatigued is part of the test, then it  could 
justifiably prevent athletes from using such substances. 
But the point is that it is up  to the sporting community  to determine if a substance erodes, 
improves, or does not affect  its sporting tests and it is on the criterion that sporting communities 
can justifiably prohibit or permit such substances. 
Sporting communities often negotiate such issues. For example, football’s recent debate over 
goal-line technology revealed a sporting community navigating how best to determine when a 
goal is scored. Golf communities have navigated which clubs to use. Baseball has determined 
that certain metal bats present an unsafe situation for the pitcher and unfairly advantage the 
batter. Similarly, if sporting communities do not see value in permitting a performance-
enhancer–that is, it does not  improve the sport  in any meaningful way, or adds extra costs and 
undesirable complications--then the simpler, substance-free, version of the sport that presents the 
same tests as the substance-enhanced version with less cost and fewer complications is to be 
preferred. Additionally, sporting communities ought to be conservative about modifying 
established, durable sporting contests. Certainly  substance-free sport has proven itself enjoyable 
and appealing, even when performance-enhancing substances were available. There is no need to 
risk harming a sport by introducing or experimenting with a substance that does not appear to 
have benefits that outweigh the perceived harms. But if such reasons existed, they would arise 
because introducing the substance negatively affected a sport’s lusory considerations or its test-
relevant values.
While the test-relevant approach reveals how sporting tests may  be directly affected by 
performance-enhancing substances, it also reveals that such substances provide slippery  slopes 
towards eroding the tests. For instance, a sporting community  can argue against a substance or 
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other technology, not because the particular substance harms the test, but because future 
improved versions of the substance push the sport in a direction that connoisseurs of the sport do 
not wish the sport to go. Although substance X may be benign, it sets a precedent for using 
substances. Once such a precedent is set, one may ask why not use even better substances? As 
new substances which offer greater increase in strength or endurance emerge, their existence 
may harm the sport’s tests. However, with such substances, the sporting communities could still 
pursue case-by-case bans rather than wholesale bans on doping.
However, critics may sense that in such a conservative argument about a sport’s test, a type 
of essentialism lurks. Essentialism is a theory  that holds that sports have certain inviolable or 
essential components. Violating these essential components means that one is no longer playing 
the sport while violating other non-essential components may be permitted.  In short, the 
essential components of a sport define that sport. Critics of essentialism such as Simon point out 
that rule violations—and rule changes—frequently  occur in sports without ruining their integrity 
(Simon, 2004). Moreover, critics have shown that it is difficult  to determine what counts as a 
central component of a sport and what does not. Thus my appeal to preserve a sport’s test may 
strike some as an unjustified appeal for the preservation of a sport’s essential characteristics.
I harbor no such essentialist perceptions of sport. My test-relevant approach asserts that 
sports can change if the change presents better or improved sporting tests. There is nothing 
special about a sport beyond its enjoyment. If the aficionados of a sport conclude that 
introducing such a technology  or substance improves the sport, even if it alters its central tests, 
the sporting community can adopt such a change. There is no reason to not adopt a change if 
more people enjoy the amended sport simply  because the previous version of the sport did not 
have such an amendment. Yet if the substance introduces no perceived benefits, the sporting 
community  can retain its well-built sporting tests as they are precisely because the old tests 
speak to that community. Rather than being essentialistic, the test-relevant approach proves 
flexible in the face of change.
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Yet this flexibility reveals why the doping debate remains such a vexing issue. For many, it 
is unclear whether doping harm sporting tests. In many ways, they appear to enhance sport as 
they  allow humans to train harder, go farther, jump higher and run faster. For example, a 
substance that prevents fatiguing could allow athletes to play longer. Such substances could also 
open new skills, new strategies and new levels of complexity that all improve the test. Thus some 
performance-enhancing substances may prove to allow people to train harder, participate more 
skillfully, and play  longer. In other words, doping might not squeeze out human agency  and 
virtue, but actually give them more room in which to operate. But doping may also harm sport. 
Critics from a sport  could argue that a substance leaves the sport relatively  unchanged, but drive 
up costs and add undesirable layers of complexity. And last, banning a substance may cause a 
number of unintended harms. As Werner Pitsch (2009) has suggested, probability indicates that 
at least a handful of innocent athletes have been found guilty of doping while guilty  athletes have 
gone unpunished. Others have pointed to the potentially  immense de-humanizing effects of anti-
doping including the invasion of athletes’ privacy, their lack of due process, and the paternalistic 
nature of anti-doping rules (Hoberman, 1992; A. Miah, 2004; Møller, 2010a). At the same time, 
all great athletic performances now fall under the suspicion of being products of illicit 
enhancements. If anti-doping bans did not exist, many of these problems posed by  their bans 
would dissolve.
Ultimately, the only  way to answer such unasked questions is for a sport’s officials and 
connoisseurs to specifically consider a substance’s effects on their sport’s tests. What matters is 
how each sporting community, which understands its sport well enough to determine whether a 
technology improves or harms it, views the relevant effects of a specific substances on their 
sport’s tests. A universal prohibited substance list that applies for all sports will ultimately prove 
ineffective because different sports will and ought to have different  attitudes about certain 
substances. Those sports which determine a substance improves its tests ought to be permitted to 
sanction its use. Therefore, a test-relevant ban on a performance-enhancing substance is 
fundamentally a contingent ban as sporting communities may later decide that a substance 
improves its test and reverse its decision to prohibit the substance.
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6. Conclusion
Those who question the justification for current bans have often mistaken the issues at  stake. 
When debating whether a sport  is justified to have passed that rule in the first place, the 
fundamental question is not of an athlete’s liberty or freedom. Instead, the fundamental question 
is how a rule alters a sport’s testing or contesting problems; considerations about safety  and 
marketability come later. If such technology  cannot be said to improve the sporting test, or if 
prohibiting such technology appears to harm the sport, then a sport  is justified in permitting it. If 
a sport  is harmed by incorporating such technology or by prohibiting the technology the sport is 
made better, then it can be said that a sport is justified to prohibit it. Additionally, the test 
relevant approach shows that there is not an absolute answer to the doping question since there is 
not an absolute decision on whether a given substance improves or harms a specific sport. Future 
decisions to either permit or prohibit PES should hinge on lusory  considerations such as fairness, 
enjoyability, the ability to demonstrate skill and the values relevant to a test. Moreover, certain 
substances appear to fit with some sports better than others. Sports, such as cycling or baseball, 
may  be better suited to permit PES as athletes in those sports have used PES so often. 
Conversely, these sporting communities may decide that they are not well-suited for PES. Such 
substances may reduce the endurance challenge and thus remove a quality that they  find worth 
keeping.15 Other sports, especially less technologically dependent sports such as running, may 
desire to keep  certain substances out so as to fit within the sport’s traditional characteristics. 
Either way, future policies should not be universal but specific to each sport, with different sports 
banning different substances as the preservation or enhancement of their specific sporting tests 
dictate.16 
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15 A special thanks to the blind reviewer who pointed this out. It  seems reasonable that communities could 
go either way, which further supports my argument.
16  Remaining open to permitting performance-enhancing substances should not  be confused with 
permitting them. In the former—and what I advocate—remaining open to such substances means not 
dismissing their use out  of hand. It  means simply considering what permitting them would entail. 
Certainly if a substance presented serious costs or grave health risks, a sporting community could decide 
not to permit  since it does not improve a sport. But  to realize such second-order concerns, a sporting 
community would have to first  be open to considering such a substance in a way that most sporting 
communities are not today.
7. Bibliography
Breivik, G. (1992). Doping Games: A Game Theoretical Exploration of Doping. International 
Review for Sociology of Sport, 27(3), 235-252. 
Brown, W. M. (2007). Paternalism, Drugs, and the Nature of Sports. In W. Morgan (Ed.), Ethics 
in Sports (2nd ed., pp. 253-262). Champaign, Ill: Human Kinetics.
Daley, R. (1960, August 30). Danish Cyclists Are Recovering, New York Times. 
Davenport-Hines, R. P. T. (2002). The pursuit of oblivion: a global history of narcotics (1st 
American ed.). New York: Norton.
Dimeo, P. (2007). A History of Drug Use in Sport 1876-1976: Beyond Good and Evil. New York: 
Routledge.
Gardner, R. (1989). On Performance-Enhancing Substances and the Unfair Advantage Argument. 
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 16, 59-73. 
Gleaves, J. (2011a). Doped Professionals and Clean Amateurs: Amateurism's Influence on the 
Modern Philosophy of Anti-Doping. Journal of Sport History, 38(2). 
Gleaves, J. (2011b). A New Conceptual Gloss, But Still Lacks Luster. Journal of Philosophy of 
Sport, 38(1), 103-112. 
Hoberman, J. (1992). Mortal Engines: The Science of Performance and the Dehumanization of 
Sport. New York: The Free Press.
Hoberman, J. (2005). Testosterone Dreams: Rejuvenation, Aphrodisia, Doping. Los Angeles: 
University of California Press.
Hoberman, J. (2006). Amphetamine and the Four-Minute Mile. Sport in History, 26(2), 289-304. 
Hoberman, J. (2007). History and Prevalence of Doping in the Marathon. Sports Medicine, 
37(4-5), 366-388. 
Hunt, T. (2011). Drug Games: The International Olympic Committee and the Politics of Doping, 
1960-2008. Austin: University of Texas Press.
Fair Play, vol.1 n.2, 2013                                                                                                       John Gleaves
Fair Play  ISSN: 2014-9255                                                                                                                                         60
Kayser, B., & Broers, B. (2012). The Olympics and Harm Reduction? Harm Reduction Journal, 
9(33), http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/9/1/33. 
Kretchmar, R. S. (1975). From Test to Contest: An Analysis of Two Kinds of Counterpoint in 
Sport. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, II, 23-30. 
Kretchmar, R. S. (2001). A Functionalist Analysis of Game Acts: Revisiting Searle. Journal of 
the Philosophy of Sport, XXVIII, 160-172. 
Loland, S. (2009). The Ethics of Performance-Enhancing Technology in Sport. Journal of the 
Philosophy of Sport, 36(2), 152-161. 
Loland, S., Skirstad, B., & Waddington, I. (2006). Pain and injury in sport : social and ethical 
analysis. London ; New York: Routledge.
Meier, K. (1988). Triad Tickery: Playing With Sport and Games. Journal of the Philosophy of 
Sport, 15, 11-30. 
Miah, A. (2004). Genetically modified athletes: biomedical ethics, gene doping and sport. New 
York: Routledge.
Miah, A., Brengt Kayser, Alexander Mauron. (2005). Legalization of Performance-Enhancing 
Drugs. Lancet, 521. 
Møller, V. (2006). Knud Enemark Jensen's Death During the 1960 Rome Olympics: A Search for 
Truth? In P. Dimeo (Ed.), Drugs, Alcohol and Sport. New York: Routledge.
Møller, V. (2008). The Doping Devil. Copenhagen, Denmark: Gyldendal.
Møller, V. (2010b). The Ethics of Doping and Anti-Doping: Redeeming the Soul of Sport. New 
York: Routledge.
Morgan, W. (2009). Athletic Perfection, Performance-Enhancing Drugs, and the Treatment-
Enhancement Distinction. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 36(2), 162-181. 
Morgan, W. J. (1995). The Logical Incomatibility  Thesis and Rules: A Reconsideration of 
Formalism as an Account of Games. In W. J. M. a. K. V. Meier (Ed.), Philosophic Inquiry in 
Sport (2nd ed., pp. 50-63). Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics.
Munthe, C. (2007). Selected Champions: Making Winners in the Age of Genetic Technology. In 
W. Morgan (Ed.), Ethics in Sports (2nd ed., pp. 273-284). Champaign, Ill: Human Kinetics.
Fair Play, vol.1 n.2, 2013                                                                                                       John Gleaves
Fair Play  ISSN: 2014-9255                                                                                                                                         61
Murray, T. (1983). The Coercive Power of Drugs in Sport. The Hastings Center Report, 13, 
24-30. 
Pegler, W. (1930, May 7). The Gate's the Thing in N.Y., Not the Fight, Chicago Tribune. 
Pitsch, W. (2009). The Science of Doping Revisited: Fallacies of the Current Anti-Doping 
Regime. European Journal of Sport Science, 9(2), 87-95. 
Rosen, D. (2008). Dope: A History of Performance Enhancement in Sports From the Nineteenth 
Century to Today. Westport: Praeger.
Russell, J. (1999). Are Rules All an Umpire Has to Work With? Journal of the Philosophy of 
Sport, 26(1), 27-49. 
Sandel, M. J. (2007). The case against perfection: ethics in the age of genetic engineering. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Schneider, A., & Butcher, R. (1994). Why Olympic Athletes Should Avoid the Use and Seek the 
Elimination of Performance Enhancing Substances and Practices From the Olympic Games. 
Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, 21, 64-81. 
Simon, R. L. (2004). Fair play : the ethics of sport (2nd ed.). Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
Simon, R. L. (2010). Fair play : the ethics of sport (3rd ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Suits, B. (2005). The Grasshopper : Games, Life and Utopia. Peterborough, Ont.: Broadview 
Press.
Tamburrini, C. (2007). Are Doping Sanctions Justified. In A. Schneider & F. Hong (Eds.), 
Doping in Sport: Global Ethical Issues (pp. 23-35). New York: Routledge.
Tamburrini, C. M., & Tännsjö, T. r. (2005). Genetic technology and sport : ethical questions. 
New York, NY: Routledge.
Thompson, C. (2008). The Tour de France: A Cultural History (2nd ed.). Los Angeles: The 
University of California Press.
WADA. (2009). The World Anti-Doping Code 2009   Retrieved from http://www.wada-ama.org/
rtecontent/document/code_v2009_En.pdf 
Fair Play, vol.1 n.2, 2013                                                                                                       John Gleaves
Fair Play  ISSN: 2014-9255                                                                                                                                         62
Waddington, I., & Smith, A. (2009). An introduction to drugs in sport : addicted to winning? 
London ; New York: Routledge.
White, G. (1986, January 15). N.C.A.A. Votes for Drug Testing, New York Times. 
Fair Play, vol.1 n.2, 2013                                                                                                       John Gleaves
Fair Play  ISSN: 2014-9255                                                                                                                                         63
